在巴菲特1983年股東信的《附錄》裡談論“商譽”下有這樣一段話：
If you cling to any belief that accounting treatment of Goodwill is the best measure of economic reality, I suggest one final item to ponder.
Assume a company with $20 per share of net worth, all tangible assets. Further assume the company has internally developed some magnificent consumer franchise, or that it was fortunate enough to obtain some important television stations by original FCC grant. Therefore, it earns a great deal on tangible assets, say $5 per share, or 25%.
With such economics, it might sell for $100 per share or more, and it might well also bring that price in a negotiated sale of the entire business.
Assume an investor buys the stock at $100 per share, paying in effect $80 per share for Goodwill (just as would a corporate purchaser buying the whole company). Should the investor impute a $2 per share amortization charge annually ($80 divided by 40 years) to calculate "true" earnings per share? And, if so, should the new "true" earnings of $3 per share cause him to rethink his purchase price?
If you cling to any belief that accounting treatment of Goodwill is the best measure of economic reality, I suggest one final item to ponder.
Assume a company with $20 per share of net worth, all tangible assets. Further assume the company has internally developed some magnificent consumer franchise, or that it was fortunate enough to obtain some important television stations by original FCC grant. Therefore, it earns a great deal on tangible assets, say $5 per share, or 25%.
With such economics, it might sell for $100 per share or more, and it might well also bring that price in a negotiated sale of the entire business.
Assume an investor buys the stock at $100 per share, paying in effect $80 per share for Goodwill (just as would a corporate purchaser buying the whole company). Should the investor impute a $2 per share amortization charge annually ($80 divided by 40 years) to calculate "true" earnings per share? And, if so, should the new "true" earnings of $3 per share cause him to rethink his purchase price?
Ch Liu兄阅後有兩個問題：
一、With such economics, it might sell for $100 per share or more。巴菲特如何計算出該公司的銷售價應為100美元，甚或更高？
二、當該公司的“真正”每股盈餘只有3美元時是否重新估算只值60美元？
一、With such economics, it might sell for $100 per share or more。巴菲特如何計算出該公司的銷售價應為100美元，甚或更高？
二、當該公司的“真正”每股盈餘只有3美元時是否重新估算只值60美元？
筆者回答:
第一条問题:
若果市場平均的合理投资回報率是5%，這個投资能每年给5元盈利，而價格只是20元，回報是25%，人們便會把手上只有5%回報的投资賣掉，買
入這投资，直至大家争相加入抬高它的價格至$100元，回報和其它投资的5元看齊才停止。
第二条問题
财务報告利潤，有别於投资利润，投资人只看多小現金收入，而财報则受限某些法律規则，例如2元的商譽攤銷並非一项計算投資回報的支出，但财務報告顯示是的盈利卻要扣減，致財務利潤變成只有3元，财務報告的回報率只有3%，投資利潤仍然是5月。
财务報告利潤，有别於投资利润，投资人只看多小現金收入，而财報则受限某些法律規则，例如2元的商譽攤銷並非一项計算投資回報的支出，但财務報告顯示是的盈利卻要扣減，致財務利潤變成只有3元，财務報告的回報率只有3%，投資利潤仍然是5月。
啓示
1.财务和投资的回報兩者是有分别，前者PE是33倍，但實際後者只是20倍；
1.财务和投资的回報兩者是有分别，前者PE是33倍，但實際後者只是20倍；
2.除了這點外，巴老想說的是有形资産回報(Return on Tangible Assets)的重要，例如有另外一支股票B，同樣要投资100元才赚到5元現金，若果B公司保留全部年利润再擴充，下年利潤會增長5%至5.25(5x(1+5%)，巴老的公司卻能運用這5元赚多1.25(5x25%)，總利润上升25%至6.25，因为公司原來有形资産只需要20元，就能赚到5元，固此它保留的盈利，都能按這比列獲额外利益。
3.有形资産回報率丶增長率和股價的関係
到第二年，B公司的PE是100➗5.025=19.9倍，股神的公司卻下跌至16倍(100➗6.25)，若果市場的合理回報仍是5%，B公司股價會上升至105元，股神的股票卻會升至125元，回報達25%。茫格曾説，股價長遠的升幅等同於ROE(實際應是有形资産自由現金流回報率),正是這意思。
到第二年，B公司的PE是100➗5.025=19.9倍，股神的公司卻下跌至16倍(100➗6.25)，若果市場的合理回報仍是5%，B公司股價會上升至105元，股神的股票卻會升至125元，回報達25%。茫格曾説，股價長遠的升幅等同於ROE(實際應是有形资産自由現金流回報率),正是這意思。
但實際又是否真的如此？
筆者以身求証，真金白銀買入了两支ROE極高的企業，並用了幾年時間，下篇文说其中的领悟。
